The need for practicality in the opposition (II): lists of senators, representatives and councilors

Escuchar la entrada

By Javier Las­salle

In the pre­vi­ous post I ex­pressed the need for prac­ti­cal­ity in the agree­ment for the pres­i­den­tial and gu­ber­na­to­r­ial po­si­tions, jus­ti­fied by the fact that the NRA re­mains at lev­els close to 50% for those po­si­tions.

The elec­tions for sen­a­tors, rep­re­sen­ta­tives and de­part­men­tal coun­cilors also re­quire some con­crete prac­ti­cal­ity by the op­po­si­tion coali­tion. Here the rea­sons are twofold: 1) the D’hondt sys­tem (used to al­lo­cate seats) pun­ishes di­vi­sion, or seen in an­other way, re­wards the most voted lists and; 2) the un­block­ing will make the ANR in­crease its vot­ers to these lists.

The D’hondt sys­tem pun­ishes the small and ben­e­fits the big. Let’s see how the D’hondt sys­tem pun­ishes di­vi­sion. The graphs show the per­cent­age of votes for each list and the per­cent­age of seats that each list ob­tained in the 2018 elec­tions, for sen­a­tors and deputies.

Source: TSJE.

Note how the large par­ties end up over-rep­re­sented in the cham­bers and how the small par­ties lose rep­re­sen­ta­tion. In the Sen­ate elec­tion more than 20% of the votes ended up with­out rep­re­sen­ta­tion and in the House of Rep­re­sen­ta­tives, over 25%. The D’hondt sys­tem pun­ishes more the di­vi­sion when there are fewer seats at stake in the list, that is why this is greater in the house than in sen­a­tors. Let us re­mem­ber that the sen­ate has a na­tional list of 45 seats, while the lists of rep­re­sen­ta­tives is de­part­men­tal and ranges from 1 to 20 seats, de­pend­ing on the pop­u­la­tion of the de­part­ment.

If the Concertation has only three or four lists (but the fewer the better), it will be a big step. The example of the municipal elections of 2021 should serve as a lesson, if not, let us see what happened to the progressive sector that made a process of “de-concertation” (the parties of the Frente Guasú presented two lists, and other progressives went to other lists) in Asunción. It went from four councilors to none.

The D’Hondt sys­tem should al­ways have been an in­cen­tive to more unity. How­ever, if we an­a­lyze the data over time, we see in each elec­tion less unity. The op­po­si­tion has not un­der­stood this for a gen­er­a­tion. To see graph­i­cally how the op­po­si­tion has not un­der­stood the D’Hondt sys­tem, Fig­ure 3 plots the num­ber of lists over time. The graph in­cludes the num­ber of lists for the sen­ate and the Asun­cion city coun­cil for the gen­eral and mu­nic­i­pal elec­tions, re­spec­tively. To main­tain con­ti­nu­ity, I mix lists for gen­eral and mu­nic­i­pal elec­tions. We see a con­stant in­crease of lists, which is detri­men­tal to them.

Num­ber of lists for coun­cilors (in Asun­ción) in mu­nic­i­pal elec­tions (1996, 2001, 2006, 2006, 2010, 2015, 2011) and for the Sen­ate in gen­eral elec­tions (1998, 2003, 2008, 2013, 2018).

Source: TSJE.

An­other as­pect to con­sider is the un­block­ing of lists. It is al­ready a re­al­ity. As many an­a­lysts an­tic­i­pated, the un­block­ing could fa­vor the big par­ties and we saw that in the mu­nic­i­pal elec­tions of 2021. Let’s see what per­cent­age of votes the ANR had for its can­di­dates for mayor and for its lists of coun­cil­men:

Fig­ure 4: Per­cent­age of ANR votes (over valid votes) in mu­nic­i­pal elec­tions since 1996. Votes for may­ors and list of coun­cilors.

His­tor­i­cally, the ANR had fewer votes for its list of coun­cil­men than for its can­di­da­cies for may­ors. If we look at the data of the gen­eral elec­tions, the votes for pres­i­dent and for the lists of sen­a­tors, rep­re­sen­ta­tives and de­part­men­tal coun­cilors show a sim­i­lar pat­tern: the votes for the lists are lower than for the can­di­dacy for pres­i­dent.

How­ever, in the 2021 elec­tion that did not hap­pen, and the ANR made an ex­cel­lent choice for coun­cilors. Why? One of the ar­gu­ments that could ex­plain is that pre­vi­ously, the ANR voter who was not sat­is­fied with the first places on their list looked for an al­ter­na­tive. With the un­block­ing, there is no or­der and one can vote for the one he likes. While there may be sev­eral un­pre­sentable can­di­dates on their list, there will be at least one that they like. Whether this is the rea­son or not, it is ir­rel­e­vant to what we are ar­gu­ing. See­ing what hap­pened in the mu­nic­i­pal elec­tions of 2021, it is a re­al­ity that the ANR will in­crease its sen­a­tors and deputies in 2023 and, if there is no strate­gic re­sponse from the op­po­si­tion, the prob­a­bil­ity of an ANR ma­jor­ity in both cham­bers is high.

What is left for the op­po­si­tion to do? Cer­tainly, to have fewer lists. Here it is nec­es­sary to take ad­van­tage of the un­block­ing, which can fa­cil­i­tate the union. Let me give an ex­am­ple: the Pa­tria Querida party in its best elec­tion (2003) won seven seats in the sen­ate. Does it need to pre­sent forty-five can­di­dates? No. Let’s sup­pose that in a mirac­u­lous elec­tion it can get fif­teen sen­a­tors. Now, how many can the En­cuen­tro Na­cional Party get? Maybe five, in an also mirac­u­lous elec­tion. Soledad Núñez’s peo­ple, with a lot of luck, eight. Hag­amos? Maybe three. Es­ti­mat­ing from above, we still do not have forty-five, so there are places for oth­ers.

Then, all these par­ties (which are not so dif­fer­ent ide­o­log­i­cally and that is why I gave them as an ex­am­ple) could make a list to­gether and run all to­gether. Maybe the Con­cer­ta­tion will not be able to have a sin­gle list, but one more left-wing, an­other one more right-wing and maybe the PLRA on its one, which is not un­rea­son­able. What is the use of look­ing for peo­ple to fill a list if other can­di­dates with pos­si­bil­i­ties from other par­ties can be added? That is the good thing about the un­block­ing, and the op­po­si­tion should be prac­ti­cal and take ad­van­tage of it.

If the Con­cer­ta­tion has only three or four lists (but the fewer the bet­ter), it will be a big step. The ex­am­ple of the mu­nic­i­pal elec­tions of 2021 should serve as a les­son, if not, let us see what hap­pened to the pro­gres­sive sec­tor that made a process of “de-con­cer­ta­tion” (the par­ties of the Frente Guasú pre­sented two lists, and other pro­gres­sives went to other lists) in Asun­ción. It went from four coun­cilors to none.

Cover im­age: ABC Color