*Por Jorge Rolón Luna
While disagreements regarding specific and operational definitions affect many concepts, ranging from “democracy” to “corruption” the term “narco-state” is aggravated by what criminologist Stanley Cohen called the “Mickey Mouse” concept. That is a superficial, imprecise, and even absurd notion frequently and frivolously used. I argue that it’s not an appropriate concept to describe the Paraguayan case because it hinders understanding the problem and finding a solution to the issues caused by drug trafficking.
First, I’ll mention some academics and experts who support the use of the “narco-state” concept. Historian Alfred McCoy defines a narco-state as one where “drugs have achieved a multifaceted mix of economic and institutional influence.” Julia Buxton, from the Central European University, believes narco-states exist when “criminal organizations connected to drug trafficking have an institutionalized presence in the state.” Matt Weiner, from the Australian National University, argues that in narco-states, “drug trafficking networks have the ability to control and regulate the state’s coercive instruments, the financial apparatus, and the executive power (…) to facilitate the production, refinement, and trafficking of narcotics.” James Rexton Can, a professor at the U.S. Army War College, says a narco-state exists where government institutions direct drug trafficking activities or collude with traffickers, creating conditions where this activity overshadows much of the legal economy.
Outside the strictly academic realm, former American diplomat David Jordan identifies five stages to classify a narco-state. The first or initial stage is when bribes go to low-level officials. The second or development stage is when government support for drug consumption grows, and the government is infiltrated or led by officials in favor of it. The third or more severe stage is when corruption of public, police, and judicial officials expands, and there’s an increase in intimidation and assassination of resisting state agents. In the fourth or critical stage, corruption infiltrates the upper ranks of the police and the judiciary. High-ranking police officers engage in trafficking, shield illicit activities, sanction political assassinations, and openly finance journalists. In the subsequent advanced stage, various ministries become compromised. The president is surrounded by implicated officials, becoming complicit in the process, and society no longer reacts with shock to these occurrences.
These definitions have several problems. Firstly, they are vague and don’t establish the “levels” of influence or institutionalization of drug trafficking required, nor the thresholds that must be crossed. Mostly, they refer to corruption – its high levels – and its connection with drug trafficking. They also describe a state controlled by drug traffickers rather than one actively engaged in the business or promoting drug production and the existence of criminal networks. This approach is problematic. For instance, if a country has high levels of smuggling or product counterfeiting, and these illegal businesses involve or corrupt its agents, could they be called “smuggle-states” or “fake-states”? Strikingly, no one uses these terms. Taken to the extreme, countries, where various illegal businesses thrive, would have very long names: smuggle-fake-narco-states.
I’ll mention some critical views on this concept to support my perspective, which is as follows: Paraguay is a country where the illegal drug trade has involved state agents from its inception to the present, in ways that still need to be determined and explained, but for which the narco-state category is insufficient.
In Paraguay, drug trafficking emerged and consolidated under the watchful eyes of successive governments – with enthusiastic participation from politicians, bureaucrats, military, and now police – not “against the state.”
According to Pierre-Arnaud Chauvy, a specialist in drug geopolitics, the narco-state is a myth, a topos used in different contexts but never satisfactorily defined or explained. Therefore, state entities that might be labeled as such don’t truly exist. The use of this term tends to oversimplify, if not mask, complex sociopolitical and economic realities.
One of the previously mentioned authors (Weiner) admits he hasn’t found a single country that matches his own characterization, suggesting such a country would only exist in a “Weberian ideal type.” These “ideal types” allow for comparing empirical realities. In this case, one would study a narco-state ideal type based on historical data analysis, construct this hypothetical (“perfect”, “ideal type”) model, and compare it with an existing one. The problem is that there’s no agreement on what that would be.
Ashley Neese Bybee, from the Institute for Defense Analysis, argues that the term’s vagueness and diffuse nature make it easier to characterize in a way that’s functional for states wanting to delegitimize others, to intervene or interfere in them, and for international organizations. Thus, the concept often hides political aims, making its use by academics puzzling. In other words, it’s a weapon thrown against enemy states.
In the Latin American context, significant experts also don’t believe in the existence of the narco-state and label it a mere “narrative,” as argued by sociologist Oswaldo Zavala from the City University of New York. Another of Mexico’s most reputed drug trafficking researchers, Luis Astorga, describes the potential existence of a political vocation that disputes state power by criminal groups as one of the many myths surrounding drug trafficking. Contrarily, it’s a purely capitalist activity, albeit illegal, that seeks only to maximize profits and has always existed subordinate to political power. Hence, it makes no sense to “create that journalistic invention called ‘narco-state’ (when) not even Pablo Escobar proposed it.” Moreover, “given the reconfiguration of political power in Mexico and the lesser concentration of power in parties and officials, it would seem more useful, less costly, and more profitable as a strategy for traffickers to invest in operational institutions, like the police and military, and not in the political arena.”
The truth is that in Paraguay, drug trafficking arose and consolidated under the watchful eyes of successive governments – with enthusiastic participation from politicians, bureaucrats, military, and now police – not “against the state.” A relationship that, obviously, can be extremely tense at times, but where the continuity of the business is good for those involved, even if occasionally state agents must show that they enforce the law and work towards that goal pointed out in 1998 by the UN, “a drug-free world.”
*Researcher. Former director of the Observatory of Coexistence and Citizen Security of the Ministry of the Interior.
Cover Image: Roberto Goiriz